University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1960

Book Review (reviewing Hugh Holleman Macauley, Jr., Fringe
Benefits and Their Federal Tax Treatment (1960))
Walter J. Blum

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Walter J. Blum, "Book Review (reviewing Hugh Holleman Macauley, Jr., Fringe Benefits and Their Federal
Tax Treatment (1960))," 12 Stanford Law Review 702 (1960).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol.12: Page 7o2

FRINGE BENFnTs Am TIm FEDERAL TAx TEA ri NT. By
Hugh Holleman Macaulay, Jr. New York: Columbia University

Press. 1959. x + 246 pages. $6.50.

As a useful generalization it can be said that the unevenness of
our federal income tax base has drawn four kinds of reactions from
tax specialists and students of taxation. One is that the many preferential provisions, in combination, are significant defects which
seriously weaken the whole structure of the income tax. The numerous preferences, so it is thought, impair the equity of the tax,
produce economic dislocations, magnify the administrative burden,
render rate changes difficult to accomplish, and cause public suspicion and discontent. A second reaction is that, on the contrary,
the preferential rules reflect reasonable legislative and judicial responses to important needs or grievances in the society. The preferences, in this view, are not deficiencies requiring repair, but rather
are sound provisions carrying out fully justifiable economic or social
policies. A third type of reaction is apathy or indifference. Confronted by a complex series of enactments, many highly technical,
and a continuous crossfire of indictment and defense of them, there
is understandable comfort in the position that preferences by and
large are here to stay and that the range of politically possible
change is so minor as not to be worth arguing over. A fourth reaction, seldom articulated for public consumption, is that the preferences are a blessing in almost transparent disguise. Whether or
not the particular instances of special treatment are meritorious,
the important thing is to have a great number of preferential provisions strategically placed throughout the law.
While I emphatically reject this last position, a few aspects of
its strength might be noted since, for obvious reasons, the affirmative
side has not been widely disseminated. A considerable number of
lawyers experienced in tax matters seem to hold such a view, although not in the extreme form in which it is here stated. To some
extent the attitude might derive from the professional habit of
seeking to find ways for clients to accomplish their goals at minimum tax costs. Since it is the preferential rules which ultimately
make tax planning a fruitful enterprise, preferences as a class may
come to be looked upon by practitioners as the most promising road
to tax reduction. Of probably greater weight in shaping this attitude is a feeling that preferences are an important protector of
taxpayer morale in the face of high taxes. There is an observable
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tendency of high income taxes to generate resistance and dissatisfaction on the part of taxpayers. When, however, one discovers or
thinks that he is getting a special break under the law, his disposition is likely to improve (especially if he does not know that others
are, on the average, getting an even better "bargain.") Of possibly greater importance in forming this attitude among lawyers
is the impression that preferences constitute the most reliable vehicle
yet devised for keeping the income tax burden from becoming unbearable-which usually means growing larger than it already is.
If preferences make it difficult for Congress to raise rates, because
of the imagined impact of higher rates on the man who fails to
qualify for any special dispensations, or because preferences encased
in technical detail are sticky to handle, so much the better. This
thought is based not so much on cynicism but on an awareness, not
to be dismissed lightly, that the graduated income tax is a formidable weapon in the hands of the government and if used unwisely could inflict damaging blows on our version of a private
enterprise society. To the skeptic regarding power in government,
an unwieldy and leaky tax is apt to appear safer than a watertight
streamlined model. This attitude is also supported by a vague
hunch among lawyers that a multitude of preferences in the law
softens the clash between the various income classes in the society.
Cohesiveness is not likely to be promoted if these classes feel that
they are in direct opposition to one another in the voting of taxes.
If only we have enough special dispensations in the law, the actual
allocation of the tax burden will remain confused and unknown,
and income taxes then can be levied with a minimum of friction.
Admittedly all this is the long way around in approaching
Fringe Benefits and Their FederalTax Treatment. However, socalled fringe benefits constitute a most important group of preferences under our present income tax, and although they most
assuredly deserve study in themselves, the question whether to treat
them in preferred fashion ultimately must come to grips with the
case for preferences generally. To those who take refuge in apathy
or who believe that a network of special treatments is an asset to
be preserved, this recent study of fringe benefits will be of no interest. To those who are concerned over the impact of preferences
on the health of our income tax, and to those who believe that any
preference carries the burden of justifying its continuance, the study
is of value in bringing together the many considerations bearing

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I2: Page 70Z

on the taxation of fringe benefits and analyzing the problems encountered in integrating them into a general income tax.
At the outset the author, after noting that there are unavoidable
difficulties in defining fringe benefits, reminds us that to a large
extent their growth has been fostered by our individual and corporate income taxes and excess profits taxes. Indeed, the growth has
been so rapid that any list of "new" fringe benefits soon gets out of
date. For example, among those benefits "making their debut in
the i95o's and achieving limited adoption have been Salk vaccine
shots, influenza shots, legal advice and representation, companyfinanced vacation trips for all employees, a full year's vacation with
pay for io years' service, medical diagnostic service, a car for every
employee (including floorsweepers), eyeglasses, false teeth, meals
for retired employees, and speed reading courses."1 It is not obvious that all fringe benefits should be subject to income tax, or how
they should be taxed. But we must beware of relying on "common
sense" in deciding these questions, since there are already too many
vested interests at large which generate a considerable bias in favor
of exempting fringe benefits from tax. Moreover, as the author
points out, we must be careful not to assume that the question of
taxability can be soundly resolved by appealing to the distinction
between "conditions of employment" and "compensation for
work." While the former term "exists in our everyday vocabulary
and is used in books dealing with labor economics and wage theory,
the term, like fringe benefits, has no commonly accepted bounds,
and, more important, it seems nowhere to be defined in relation to
wages."2 To avoid these traps, "a logical, consistent definition of
income would appear to be the starting point in a search for tax
treatment of fringe benefits."' The definition favored in the study
is a broad one under which "any utility, satisfaction, or 'usance'
which the employee enjoys because of expenditures of the employer
would constitute consumption by the employee and so income to
'' 4

him.

While a definition of income is the proper starting place, it is
only that. Since "the tax treatment of fringe benefits entails one
set of difficulties if the benefits are taxed and a different set of
1. P. 15.
2. P. 31.
3. P. 32.

4. Ibid.
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difficulties if they are not taxed,"5 the author advocates that "an
attempt should be made to choose that course of action which would
entail minimum aggregate difficulty."' His term "difficulty" embraces not only matters of administration but "problems in equity,
tax rates, incentives, resource allocation, business fluctuations, and
many other fields as well as administration."' He recognizes that
because "these fields of difficulty have no common unit of measurement, the minimization of these difficulties or problems will largely
rest on the relative values assigned to them by each individual."'
This consideration establishes the main guideline for the first half
of the study: 'What should be attempted, then, is a discussion or
description of the difficulties likely to be encountered in each of
these areas, first, under the assumption that fringe benefits are not
taxed and, second, under the assumption that fringe benefits are
taxed. The individual, having the sum of these difficulties laid before him, is then in a better position to decide on their tax treatment."D
In the ensuing analysis, by far the most prominent concern is
with the economic effects of the tax treatment of fringe benefits.
Perhaps the explanation for this emphasis is that more can be said
about economic effects than about other considerations; or possibly
it is attributable to the special training and interests of the author.
Considerable attention is devoted to investigating the effects of
fringe benefits in general on the allocation of resources, on the
mobility of labor in our society, and on the so-called cyclical stability of the economy. The conclusions are not very startling: "the
introduction of fringe benefits into the economic system will lead
to a lower level of consumption from given expenditures made on
behalf of lower income employees; will ...

introduce an element

of automatic wage flexibility since wages are paid to some extent
in kind; will make it necessary to have larger changes in tax rates
to achieve a given effect on economic stabilization; will lead to
a lower level of consumer satisfaction from given expenditures
on employees; has . . .reduced the mobility of labor in many
...

cases .

.

..

5. P. 33.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. P. 85.
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While the first half of the study deals with fringe benefits "as
though they were a homogeneous mass," the second half proceeds
on the assumption that it "is safer to subject the individual fringe
benefits to examination one at a time and then to try to reach a
decision on each one of these as to effects of the present tax treatment and possible alternative forms of tax treatment."'1 Successive
chapters take up retirement benefits, including pension and profit
sharing plans; life insurance and death benefits, including social
security and widow's benefits; unemployment and health insurance; and fringe benefits in kind, including meals, housing and
medical care for employees and their families. In the case of each
benefit the analysis follows the directional lines developed in the
first half of the study, accompanied by some descriptive material
regarding the existing tax treatment and the extent to which it
constitutes a preferred position.
To the lawyer seeking guidance in advising clients on the legal
status of fringe benefits, the study is not intended to be useful. The
description of the existing law is too superficial for that purpose.
It is to the lawyer interested in the policy aspects of taxing fringe
benefits that the study should appeal. Unfortunately this appeal
might suffer somewhat from the literary style of the book. In what
apparently is the vogue in social science manuscripts, authors of
other works are referred to in the text by last name alone, as though
the reader of course were acquainted with the whole fraternity. For
an outlander it is a bit annoying to read: "Pigou, while not mentioning the difference between [something] ... and [something]
... notes that the tax gatherer will have to be content with [something else] .... Vickrey notes [something] .... Simons in discussing taxation of compensation in kind, is no more optimistic."'"
The annoyance becomes stronger when the sentence begins with
"Due argues that . . . ."" Not until the next sentence did I realize
that no typesetting error had occurred but that the reference was to
a man named Due, who I happily was then able to identify as John
Due, an economist. Another manifestation of the academic style
which presumes familiarity with the literature is nicely illustrated
by a quotation in the text which reads: "The problem of Kleinwachter's Flugeladjutantis insoluble and certainly is not amenable
11. P. 89.
12. Pp. 29-30.
13. P. 65.
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to reasonable solution on the basis of simple rules which could be
administered by revenue agents."'" Largely by happenstance I was
in the fortunate position of not having to look at the footnotes to
learn what the insiders presumably already know: "Kleinwachter's
Flugeladjutantis a fictional character who is traditionally used to
emphasize the problems connected with the taxation of income in
.. In [the] ... capacity [of flugeladjutant] he enjoys
kind..
quarters at the royal palace . .. and attends the theater and opera

with the sovereign ... [but] he dislikes palace living, the theater,
and the opera."'" The academic tradition comes out in force in
another respect when we read in the text, "This can be stated in
simple algebraic terms as n - y - ty or n = y (z -

t)."'" At this

point my luck ran out, and I was left with a faint wish that all algebraic formulations had been relegated to the footnotes. These, however are scattered items, and it would be wrong to generalize from
them that, to accommodate lawyers, the places of the footnotes and
the text might better have been reversed.
Despite these small detractions (and I admittedly overplay
them), the study provides both a good survey and a thoughtful
analysis of one of the hardest territories in the province of income
taxation. I would endorse most of the conclusions about the handling of particular fringe benefits. In reaching them, however, I
would in general place less weight on economic considerations and
more on basic notions of equity. But since this is a period in which
our policy makers like to talk a good deal about economic consequences, in this respect it is not the author of the study but I who
seem to be out of step.
WALTm

J. BLuM'e

oF LAws. By Robert A. Leflar. IndianCo.
1959.
lxxii + 467 pages. $9.5o .
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill
TI-E LAw
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In the 193o's Professor Robert Leflar of the University of
Arkansas found that the conflict of laws of that state could not be
adequately treated by simply annotating the state's appellate cases
14. P. 30.
15. Pp. 200-201.
16. P. 40.
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

